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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ARTHUR 0. NAUMAN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
HAROLD K. BEECHER AND ASSOCIATES, a Utah Corporation,

Civil No.
11579

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

The Amicus Curiae files this brief pursuant to permission and order of the Court. Amicus Curiae represents the Consulting Engineers Council which is a professional organization comprised of those engineers who
engage in the profession of designing component parts
of structures and reviewing their installation.
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REASON FOR INTERCESSION
Consulting engineers engage in a profession similar
to architects in that they, by contract and custom, also
have a definite role in connection with the planning and
drawing of specifications for structures, and reviewing
the progress of the construction. Hence, the decision of
this Court and the District Court in this case vitally
affects all consulting engineers who, similar to architects,
perform design services pursuant to contract.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Amicus Curiae in behalf of the Consulting Engineers
Council accepts the statement of facts summarized by
the Appellant in its brief.

I.

THE ARCHITECTS HAD NO DUTY CREATED
BY CONTRACT OR CUSTOM TO PRESCRIBE OR TO
INTERFER WITH THE CONTRACTOR'S METHODS
OF DOING HIS WORK.

An architect is a professional whose specialized role
is to design a structure and insure that it is built according to his plans. The contractor whose bid is accepted
to build the structure also has a responsibility to insure
that his work is done according to the architect's plans.
However, the contractor has an important prerogative
of choosing among various construction methods in com-
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plying with the architect's plans. If the architect interferes with these methods, then the basis upon which the
contractor submitted his bid is altered, and the contractor may lose money.
This court recognized the above principle when the
parties to this action were before the Court on another
issue:
"The method of construction was a matter
solely under the control of the contractor, and the
defendant [architect] had no right to interfere
with the contractor's execution of the work, ... "
Nauman v. Beecher, 19 Utah 2d. 101, 426 P2d 621
(1967).
The agreement between the architect and the CityCounty (Ex. P-1) (R. 520) provided that the architect
furnish a qualified on-site inspector to supervise and inspect all phases of the work being done. The pertinent
portion of that agreement follows:
"7. General Administration. The Architect
shall furnish at his expense a qualified on-site in-.
spector, acceptable to both Owner and Architect,
during the entire time the construction work is in
progress, whose duties shall consist of checking
all shop drawings, for approval of the City Engineer, to determine the quality and acceptance
of the material and/or equipment proposed to be
used in the facilities being constructed; to supervise and inspect all phases of the work being done.
(Emphasis added.)
The above quoted language is phrased in general
terms onlY and must not be giYen an interpretation re-

.'
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quiring architects to supervise daily work methods, techniques, and safety measures. The supervision contemplated pertains to construction in compliance with the
plans and specifications and does not extend to matters
of health, safety or economics.
The architect in preparing plans for the Metropolitan Hall of Justice Complex included a utility tunnel
extending from the Complex to the old City and County
Building located across the street. It was during excavation for the untility tunnel that the accident occurred
giving rise to this suit. The architect's plans did not
show how the utility tunnel was to be installed. (R. 952);
the methods and means of construction were stirctly the
responsibility of the contractor. (R-773). In fact, it is
conceivable that the contractor could have decided to
burrow instead of trench. The architect does not determine the method of executing the work and therefore
should not be responsible for injuries resulting from alleged unsafe methods utilized by the contractor. To require otherwise will bring chaos to contstruction "planners," architects and engineers and impose upon them
the role of being an absolute insurer.
The language in the agreement between the CityCounty and the architect requiring the architect to
"supervise and inspect" the work is similar to provisions in contracts between general contractors and subcontractors requiring general contractors to supervise
the work of a subcontractor. Many cases have considered
the analogous situation where an employee of a subcon-
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tractor brings suit against a general contractor for negligence in supervising and allowing an unsafe condition
to exist. The recent case of Chesin Construction Co. v.
Epstein, 8 Ariz. App. 312, 44G P.2d 11 (1968) is typical.
In that case, an employee of a subcontractor sued the
general contractor for negligent supervision. The Court
held that the subcontract provision that all work be done
under direct supervision of the contractor's representative did not constitute evidence of retained control sufficient to impose liability on the ground of failure of the
general contractor to properly supervise the subcontractor's work procedures.
The Chesin case found it was not uncommon for a
general contractor to provide in a subcontract for a right
of supervision, and that such a proviso does not destroy
the normal shield from liability. Chesin quotes the case
of 111 oore v. Phillips, 197 Ark. 131, 120 S.W. 2d 722
(1938), 446 P. 2d at 14-15:
"There are countless decisions of appellate
courts construing stipulations in contracts, such
as here involved, relating to the right of the owner
'to give directions'-'orders' and 'instructions' regarding the work as it progresses; and phrases
such as 'in accordance with instructions'-'as directed'-'under supervision of owner's agent, as
he may direct'-and 'under the direction and
supervision', are frequently construed. In all of
the cases examined, some of which are cited, it is
held that such phrases do not relate to the method
of manner and do not govern the details or the
physical means by which the work is to be performed. The Supreme Court of the United States

5
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has so held in two cases directly in point. Casement v. Brown, 148 U.S. 615, 13 S.Ct. 672, 37 L.Ed.
582; United States v. Driscoll 96 U.S. 421, 24 L.Ed.
847." 120 S.W. 2d at 727.
More recent decisions adopt this same view:
Wallach v. United States, 291 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.
1961); Gallagher v. United States lines Co., 206.
F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied 346 U.S. 897,
74 S.Ct. 221, 98 L.Ed. 398 (1953); Walker v. Wittenberg, Delony & Davidson, Inc., 241 Ark. 525,
412 S.W.2d 621 (1966), on rehearing 242 Ark. 97,
412 S.W.2d 621, 626 (1967); Bedford v. Bechtel
Corp., 172 Cal.App.2d 401, 342 P.2d 495 (1959);
Potter v. City of Kenosha, 268 Wis. 36_h 68 N.W.
2d 4 (1955)." (Emphasis added.)
The language used in the instant agreement-"to
supervise and inspect all phases of the work being done"
-is clearly similar in meaning to the phrases dealt with
in Chesin. This language did not require the architect to
inspect safety practices during each phase of the construction project.
The agreement made by the architect provided for
professional services of a specialized nature. The contract to supervise did not include an implied warranty '
to insure the safety of all employees of the contractor
and each subcontractor. The supervision ref erred to in
the agreement in the instant case pertains only to construction in accordance with the plans and specifications.
Some situations may require recovery for personal
injuries despite the lack of a contractual basis. Such a
situation is that of a manufacturer's liability for injuries

6
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caused by his products without regard to privity of contract or negligence. See the landmark case of Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A2d. 69
( 1960). However, a professional service, such as architecture or engineering, does not lend itself to a doctrine
of liability without fault because it lacks the elements
that give rise to the doctrine, such as mass advertising
and production, or distant consumers. Justice Traynor
recognized this distinction in Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal.2d
481, 275 P.2d 15, 20-21 (1954):
"The general rule is applicable that those
who sell their services for the guidance of others
in their economic, financial and personal affairs
are not liable in the absence of negligence or intentional misconduct....
The services of experts are sought because
of their special skill. They have a duty to exercise
the ordinary skill and competence of members of
their profession, and a failure to discharge that
duty will subject them to liability for negligence.
Those who hire [experts] ... are not justified in
expecting infallibility, but can expect only reasonable care and competence. They purchase service,
not insurance. (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, the test for liability in this case is based on
the neg.Zigence of the architect, not a breach of a contractual duty.
In determining the standard of care owed to third
parties by an architect, the same test is applied as with
doctors and lawyers. An architect holds himself out as
an expert in his particular line of work and is employed
7
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because he is believed to be such. See 5 Am. Jur. 2d,
Architects, §9.
In Paxton v. Alameda County, 259 P.2d 934, (Cal.
App. 1953), an architect was sued for negligence in designing a building. The Court approved the following insfruction which represents the prevailing law:
"By undertaking professional service to a
client, an architect impliedly represents that he
possesses, and it is his duty to posses, that degree
of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by architects of good standing, practicing the same locality. It is his further duty to use the care ordinarily exercised in like cases by reputable members of his profession practicing in the same locality; to use reasonable diligence and his best
judgment in the exercise of his skill and the application of his learning in an effort to accomplish the purpose or which he is employed... In
determining whether the defendants architects'
learning, skill and conduct fulfilled the duties imposed by law, as they have been stated to you,
you are not permitted to set up arbitrarily a stan-'
dard of your own. The standard is that set by the
learning, skill and care ordinarily possessed and
practiced by others of the same profession in the
same locality, at the same time." (Emphasis added.)
It is submitted that the above instruction applies equally
well to an architect performing his professional duties
by supervising the construction.

Utah has consistently held that professional opinion
is necessary to determine whether an expert, such as a
doctor, exercised reasonable care and skill usually exer-
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cised by other experts in the same community. See. e.g.
Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108
(1959); Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523
(1957). However, an obvious breach of due care by a
professional requires no expert testimony to establish
negligence. James v. Robertson, 39 Utah 414, 117 P. 1068
( 1911). There was no evidence of such breach of due care
in this case.
In the instant case, four architects including the defendant's president, testified the excavation appeared
safe. (See R-723, R-751, R-831, R-844, R-914, R-986.) No
architect testified that the excavation was unsafe. In addition, the plaintiff testified that he thought the excavation was safe (R-692). Also the operator of the drag
line, and who assisted in the removal of Mr. Nauman
after the accident (R-891), and the project manager for
the general contractor (R-803), testified that the excavation was safe. Hence, it must be concluded that the excavation was not obviously unsafe, and that the standard
of care of the defendant must have been reasonable because no other architects in the community testified that
the excavation was unsafe. The evidence only supports
the conclusion that the defendant was not negligent.
If this Court affirms the lower court result on the
basis that the architect had a duty based on the contract
provisions to supervise work, including safety aspects,
architects will be forced to become insurers of construction site safety standards whenever they enter into an
architectural contract which includes a proviso for superv1s10n. Hence, construction workers on projects designed
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by an architect or engineer will have a bonus "insurance
policy" in addition to workmen's compensation.
There is no basis for affirming the architect's liability on the provisions of the contract. The general requirement for supervising the construction was a professional service owed to the owner for the purpose of
insuring that the construction proceeded in compliance
with the architectual drawings. This "supervision" cannot be interpreted as establishing a duty to supervise and
insure the safe conduct of all phases of the construction.
The duty owed by the architect in this case is solely one
of his duty as a professional.

II.

PLAINTIFF'S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY IS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION.

The plaintiff has received and is receiving workmen's compensation benefits. This is his exclusive
remedy against the employer-or any employee or agent
of the employer-for injuries sustained. Section 35-1-60,
Utah Code Annotated, (1953). However, he has filed suit
against defendant alleging the workmen's compensation
statutes do not preclude such action because the def endant is not in the same employment as plaintiff. It is
submitted that plaintiff's position cannot be justified. He
bases the architect's liability on the very grounds that
workmen's compensation benefits are based - that is,
"same employment." It is recognized by all that the
architect was required to be at the construction site for
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the same reason the plaintiff was there; they were· both
employees of the City-County. Workmen's compensation
statntes have established the exclusive remedy for such
injuries. Section 35-1-62, Utah Code Annotated (1953)
provides in part:

"Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts
of third parties-Reniedies of employee-Rights
of employer or insitrance carrier in cause of actio11r-Maintenance of action----Disbursement of
proceeds of rccovery.-When an injury or death
for which compensation is payable under this
title shall have been caused by the wrongful act
or neglect of another person not in the same employment, the injured employee, or in case o.f
death his dependents, may claim compensation
and the injured employee or his heirs or personal
representative may also have an action for damages against such third person ... " (Emphasis
added.)
It is submitted that both the defendant and plaintiff were
in the same employment and the above cited statute bars
this action by the plaintiff.
The City-County employed the architect to design the
Metropolitan Hall of Justice and Jail Complex and supervise its construction in accordance with the design. (See
Ex. P-1) He ·was an agent of the city-county. (See Paxton
v. Alameda County, sitpra, at 946.) This clearly requires
that the architect \Vork closely with the contractor, subcontractors and individual workers at the Complex. By
separate contract, the City-County employed the contractor to build the Complex, and required the contractor
to follow certain directiYes of the architect. (See Ex. P-2)
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The City-County, through these contracts with the
architect and the contractor, employed each of them to
work on the joint project. By these same contracts, the
City supervised and retained control over them and their
employees. For example, the City Engineer represented
the City-County and had control over the architect pursuant to paragraph 13 of contract between City-County
and the architect (Ex. P-1):
"13. SUPERVISION. The City Engineer
will represent the Owner, Salt Lake City Corporation, with respect to this agreement, and the Architect shall perform and conduct all required services under his direction and supervision and shall
submit his reports of study, drawings, design, details, specifications and reco1mnendations to him
for City approval, as well as all shop drawings,
change orders, estimates for payment to Contractor as required."
Likewise, the City-County exercised extensive control
over the contractor pursuant to paragraph 12a of contract
between the City-County and the contractor (Ex. P-2):
"12a. If, in the judgment of the Architect
and/or the City Engineer or County Engineer, it
is necessary to close down the work due to inclement weather or due to other circumstances
arising during the progress of the work, that may
be construed to be dangerous or that may be
caused by non-compliance with the specifications,
the Contractor shall comply and he shall stop all
operations upon written notice from the Architect
and/or City Engineer or County Engineer so to
do, and the work shall remain closed down until
further orders in writing are given by said Architect and/or City Engineer or County Engineer to
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the contractor to proceed with the work of this
project, and there shall be no claim against either
Salt Lake City Corporation or Salt Lake County,
or the Architect or Engineers, for such action."
The City-County appointed a project engineer to
represent its interests at the Complex site (R-9'54). Both
the architect and the contractor reported to the CityCounty representative and made no changes or revisions
without his approval.
Section 35-1-42, Utah Code Annotated (1953), defines
employers for the purpose of the ·workmen's Compensation Act. In pertinent part it states:
35-1-42. Employers enumerated and defined
-Re gitlarly employed-Independent contractors.
-The following shall constitute employers subject to the provisions of this title:
(1) The state, and each county, city, town
and school district therein.
(2) Every person, firm and private corporation, including every public utility, having in service one or more workmen or operatives regularly
under contract of hire, express or implied, oral or
written . . .
·where any employer procures any work to
be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor
over whose work he retains supervision or control,
and such work is a part or process in the trade or
business of the employer, such contractor, and all
persons employed by any such subcontractors,
shall be deemed, within the meaning of this section,
emplo~·ees of snch original employer. Any person,
firm or corporation engaged in the performance
of work as an independent contractor shall be

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

deemed an employer within the meaning of this
section. The term 'independent contractor,' as
herein used, is defined to be any person, association or corporation engaged in the performance of
any work for another, who, while so engaged, is
independent of the employer in all that pertains
to the execution of the work, is not subject to the
rule or control of the employer, is engaged only in
the performance of a definite job or piece of work,
and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in accordance with the employer's design."
The work of erecting a City-County Complex is "a
part or process" in the business of the Employer-City, as
required by the above-quoted statute. Section 10-8-5, Utah
Code Annotated (1953) dealing with the powers and of all
cities says:
"10-8-5. Erection and Care of Buildings.
They may erect all needful buildings for the use of
the city, and provide for their care."
Both the plaintiff and the architect must be considered as working on the same general project toward the
joint goal of completion. They were not strangers, but
rather were co-workers jointly engaged in the same endeavor, both subject to the supervision of the city.
This court dealt with a similar situation in Cook v.
Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 15 Utah 2d 20, 386 P.2d 616 (1963).
In that case two construction companies were working
jointly in a diversion tunnel at Flaming Gorge Dam. The
plaintiff, an employee of one company, was doing work
and received some directions from engineer employees of
the defendant company. Plaintiff was injured, allegedly
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because of the negligence of the engineers. This court held
that the plaintiff was in effect an employe of both the defendant and the other company, and workmen's compensation was his exclusive remedy because both companies
w0re regarded as the employing unit.
In interpreting the language of Section 35-1-62, Utah
Cod<' Annotated, (1953) i-iitpra, this court said at 617:
"In approaching the question here presented
it is well to keep in mind that the philosophy behind the vVorkmen's Compensation Act encompasses two main objectives. The first is to assure
that an employee who is injured in employment
will have necessary medical and hospital care and
modest but certain compensation for his injury,
with resulting benefits to himself, his family and
to society generally; the other is to afford employers a measure of protection against exorbitant
claims for injuries." (Emphasis added.)

This court then concluded at 617:
"The language of the statute preserving an
action against'* * * third persons' who are 'not in
the same employment* * *'seems plainly designed
to apply to strangers to the empoyment and not to
co-workers jointly engaged in the same endeavor."
(Emphasis added.)
Similarly, in the recent case of Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d 139, 442 P.2d 31 (1968), this court held
that the plaintiff and defendant were in the same employ,
so lJlaintiff's action \YaS barred by the exclusive remedy
provisions of the orkmen's Compensation Act.

'"T

In Gallegos, defendant owned a dump truck and
agreed to furnish it with a driver to a construction
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company. The defendant received $10.00 an hour for the
truck and driver out of which he paid the driver. The construction company maintained no employment records of
the driver, but did control where he would drive, haul dirt
an<l so on. While backing the truck, the driver injured an
employee of the construction company. In holding that
the driver and the injured person were in the same employ, the court based its decision on control of the construction company over both the driver and the injured
person.
The architect and plaintiff in the instant case are in
the similar situation of both working on the same endeavor, both subject to control by the same employer, and
logically both limited to workmen's compensation as an
exclusive remedy for injuries sustained.

CONCLUSION
Neither the contract nor the custom of the architects
establishes a duty on the part of an architect to supervise
the safety practices of a contractor or its employees. The
duty of supervision owed by the architect encompasses
only the supervision required to insure that the work
progresses in accordance with the architectural plans.
Architects, as all professionals, recognize their duty
to properly design structures, and they honor this duty
by supervising and inspecting the construction progress
to insure compliance with the plans. If their duty is extended to encompass day-to-day safety practices of indi-
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vidual workers only chaos can result because contractors
will be unable to bid on or build structures without being
subjected to the unpredictable requirements created by
third parties.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY
ROBERT M. ANDERSON
ROBERT D. MERRILL
Amicus Curiae
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

